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A B S T R A C T 
 
Demand for the use of online services such as free emails, social networks, and online polling is increasing at an exponential rate. 
Due to this, online service providers and retailers feel pressurised to satisfy the multitude of end-user expectations. Meanwhile, 
automated computer robots (known as ‘bots’) are targeting online retailers and service providers by acting as human users and 
providing false information in order to abuse their service provisioning. CAPTCHA is a set of challenge/response protocol, which 
was introduced to protect online retailers and service providers from misuse and automated computer attacks. Text-based 
CAPTCHAs are the most popular form, and are used by most online service providers to differentiate between the human users 
and bots. However, the vast majority of text-based CAPTCHAs have been broken using the Optical Character Recognition (OCR) 
techniques and thus, reinforces the need for developing a secure and robust CAPTCHA model. Security and usability are the two 
fundamental issues that pose a trade-off in the design of a CAPTCHA; a hard CAPTCHA model could also be difficult for human 
users to resolve, which affects its usability, and vice versa. The model developed in this study uses the unsurpassed abilities of the 
Human Visual System (HVS) to superimpose and integrate complex information presented in individual frames, using the 
mechanism of trans-saccadic memory. In this context, the model integrates in its design the concept of persistence of vision, 
which enables humans to see the world in a continuous fashion. Preliminary results from the proposed model based on this 
technique are encouraging. As a result of this research, we have achieved 65% improvement in terms of the character recognition 
success rate for human users compared to the current computer recognition programs for multi-frame scenarios.  Its ability to 
remain unbroken by current OCR programs for single-frame scenarios is over 98%. 
Keywords – CAPTCHA; Persistence of vision; Trans-Saccadic memory; Visual integration; Authentication; Security 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, most of us are familiar with online retailer 
webpages asking their users to retype a selection of distorted 
characters from an image before allowing them access to their 
online services. At times, this process may be frustrating and 
can require a considerable amount of time and effort to visually 
inspect and type out these blurry characters and numbers. 
These distorted images are an example of CAPTCHAs 
(Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers 
and Humans Apart). CAPTCHAs (Luis von Ahn, 2004) were 
developed to protect websites and online service providers 
from possible cyber-attacks originating from automated 
computer programs (bots), and are the principal shield in 
protecting websites from being abused by bots and spams.  The 
term ‘CAPTCHA’ was first introduced by Luis von Ahn in the 
year 2000 at Carnegie Mellon University (Luis von Ahn, 
2010).  This process has also been referred to as the ‘Reverse 
Turing Test’ (Chellapilla, 2005).  An example of one of the 
famous current CAPTCHA models, known as ReCAPTCHA is 
shown in Fig. 1. 
As demand for online services rapidly grows, it is essential 
to have a mechanism that cannot only recognise the users as 
genuine, but at the same time can also ensure that users are real 
humans rather than automated computer programs (or ‘bots’). 
There is a direct correlation between growing numbers of 
online users, and a rapid rise in the number of cyber-attacks in 
recent years. Automated computer attacks abuse online service 
providers by supplying false information to systems and acting 
as human users (Anon., 2014). Human Interactive Proofs 
(HIPs) or CAPTCHAs are a set of challenge/response protocols 
designed in the form of a challenge or a test that can be 
presented to the users in order to distinguish human users from 
computer automated programs (Chew, 2003).  HIPs are 
designed to be easy for human users to solve, and should be 
very challenging (and ideally impossible) for automated 
computer programs to break.  
 
Fig. 1 - Example of one of the most popular current CAPTCHAs, known 
as ReCAPTCHA (Marc, 2011) 
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CAPTCHAs are used for a variety of online applications 
such as free email accounts, e-commerce, online polling, 
chatrooms, and many other interactive online services 
(Carnegie Mellon University, 2000-2010).  According to von 
Ahn (Ahn, et al., 2003) the idea behind a CAPTCHA is to use 
the sophisticated abilities of the human perceptual system in 
order to resolve a problem, which cannot be addressed by 
computer programs.  Over the past decade, various CAPTCHA 
models were introduced and used widely by major online 
service providers such as Yahoo!, Google and Microsoft as 
well as social networks such as Facebook, in order to provide 
better security against automated computer attacks. 
However, there has been extensive research on the security 
of CAPTCHAs as most CAPTCHA models have been broken 
using sophisticated recognition techniques (Jeff Yan, 2009). In 
this paper, a novel CAPTCHA model is introduced called 
Visual Integration CAPTCHA (VICAP), which makes use of 
the abilities of the human visual perception system to 
superimpose and integrate fleeting image frames of noisy 
partial information in order to create a final object, which can 
then be recognised by the brain. The proposed approach 
involves generating a sequence of image frames, which are 
obtained by sampling the binarized version of the original 
image, consisting of a string of characters, and adding in 
background noise to increase the security of the model. Next, 
the sequence of these images is played back at an appropriate 
frame rate so that the brain perceives it as a continuous 
animation, and thus, recognising the original object. 
 When consecutive frames are displayed at very high 
speeds, visual information can be integrated into the Visual 
Short Term Memory (VSTM), which allows humans to 
perceive and complete the image of the original object.  Each 
individual frame contains only a part of the original object 
pixels. Therefore, by analysing and processing a single frame, 
no useful information regarding the original object can be 
retrieved, thus rendering it unsuitable for OCR algorithms.  The 
robustness of the proposed CAPTCHA model was tested using 
the state of the art CAPTCHA Breaker program.  The final 
results demonstrate that the proposed CAPTCHA model is 
robust against various types of cyber security attacks. 
Our main contributions to this research can be listed as 
follows: 
 We have used the concept of visual psychophysics in 
order to design a novel CAPTCHA model, which would 
only be understandable for human users and not current 
computer programs. 
 Persistence of vision has been applied on the new 
CAPTCHA model in order to superimpose and integrate 
all the CAPTCHA images to form an object in the brain. 
 The proposed CAPTCHA model has been tested and 
evaluated on both human users and computer 
recognition programs in order to formulate the best 
possible CAPTCHA design with the optimal 
recognition success rate in terms of both computer 
security and usability. 
 The Recognition Improvement Level (RIL) has been 
achieved for human users with having a 65% increase in 
recognition success rates compared to current computer 
recognition programs for multi-frame scenarios. 
 The new CAPTCHA’s ability to be unrecognisable to 
current OCR programs for single frame scenario has 
increased by 98%.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 will give a 
brief introduction regarding computer security and the 
importance of CAPTCHA in our daily online activities.  Key 
background information on CAPTCHA, together with 
discussion of types of CAPTCHA categories, will then be 
discussed in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 will present our 
proposed CAPTCHA model and the relevant methodologies 
behind it.  In Section 5, some of the evaluation and 
experimental results will be provided and discussed.  Finally, 
Section 6 will draw together the conclusions from our study. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. What is CAPTCHA? 
As shown in Fig. 2, a CAPTCHA is generated by an online 
server and a client would respond in a challenge/response 
environment.  When a client requests a service from an online 
entity, firstly, he or she sends a request message to the web 
server.  Depending on the nature of the online service type, the 
web server will then decide whether to allow the user access to 
the requested resource, or else to authenticate the user before 
allowing them the online access. Where any requested 
resources are protected, the web server will invoke the 
CAPTCHA generator application to create a new CAPTCHA 
challenge, which is then sent to the user via the same 
communication channel.  The user is then required to solve the 
challenge and provide the answer to the request in order to 
prove that they are a human user. A brief description of the 
operation of CAPTCHA is shown in Fig. 2.  
 
Fig. 2 - General framework for the CAPTCHA authentication process 
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The CAPTCHA generator application is made up of two 
separate elements.  One is the CAPTCHA image database, 
which consists of all the information that a CAPTCHA 
application is using in order to measure the level of accuracy 
(in other words, whether or not the answer is correct). The 
second element is called the CAPTCHA verification element, 
which works as a judge.  If the input data from the user 
matches with the CAPTCHA image stored in the database, then 
the user will be authenticated and will have access to the 
requested online services.  However, if the user response from 
the client side does not match the database information on the 
server, then the CAPTCHA generator application will deny 
access, and the user will have to try this process again until he 
or she provides the correct response. 
2.2. Types of CAPTCHAs 
CAPTCHAs are available in many different shapes and 
formats depending on their specifications and security 
functionality. We can classify CAPTCHAs into three main 
categories: OCR-based, non OCR-based and non-visual-based 
(Moradi, M. & Keyvanpour, M., 2015). Fig. 3 is a 
representation of the different CAPTCHA types based on their 
classification, where each class has its own conditions and 
specifications.  Based on previous research, OCR-based or 
text-based CAPTCHAs are the most popular schemes 
implemented to date.  These types of CAPTCHAs are easier in 
terms of web integration and implementation.  In addition, they 
are more efficient in terms of design and evaluation. The 
reason that these types of CAPTCHAs are labelled ‘OCR-
based’ is because the challenge is made up of different 
distorted characters and text.  Also, character recognition 
software (OCR) needs to be used in order to break the 
CAPTCHA.  
Non OCR-based CAPTCHAs utilise multimedia features 
such as video, images, or a picture of a natural scene. Examples 
of these types of CAPTCHAs are Collage CAPTCHA (Shirali-
Shahreza, M. & Shirali-Shahreza, S., 2007), PIX (Luis von 
Ahn, et al., 2004), Bongo (Luis von Ahn, et al., 2004), Asirra 
CAPTCHA (J. H. J. S. Jeremy Elson, 2007), and 
GeoCAPTCHA (Te-En Wei, et al., 2012), all of which are 
based on the recognition of an image or a group of images 
using a specific criteria. There is another type of CAPTCHA 
not based on the visual recognition, known as an audio-based 
CAPTCHA.  The purpose behind audio-based CAPTCHAs was 
to overcome some of the weaknesses of OCR-based 
CAPTCHAs. Specifically, in some OCR-based CAPTCHAs 
the text is too distorted or significantly deformed, and 
therefore, it is cumbersome for users to read and recognise.  In 
that case, they usually put the audio version of the same text as 
an alternative way of solving the CAPTCHA. This version of 
the program randomly picks a word or a sequence of numbers. 
It then transforms the word or sequence of numbers into a short 
audio clip and mixes it with a reasonable level of background 
noise. It then presents the distorted audio clip to the user, who 
must then recognise and type in the content of the sound clip 
(Haichang Gao, et al., 2010). This method is based on the 
auditory ability of humans to realise the distorted words or 
numbers with a moderate level of background noise present; it 
is very difficult for most voice recognition software to 
distinguish between a central voice and background noise 
(Haichang Gao, et al., 2010). 
 
2.3. Related Works 
In the last decade, as the number of online threats have 
been increasing, much attention has been paid to the 
development of CAPTCHA technologies.  However, the vast 
majority of research in this field concentrates on the text-based 
CAPTCHA because these kinds of CAPTCHA are the most 
popular, and are widely used across the web.  EZ-GIMPY is 
one of the most popular dictionary-based CAPTCHA models, 
which challenges clients to read distorted or corrupted 
characters (Ahn, 2000-2003). It was originally built for Yahoo! 
in order to prevent bots from entering their chatrooms, and to 
prevent computer programs from harvesting a large number of 
email accounts. However, the model introduced by Mori and 
Malik (2003) could break this CAPTCHA type with a 33% 
success rate. In addition, Yan and Ahmad (2007) could also 
show that most of the current text-based CAPTCHAs can be 
broken using pixel-count attacks.  The Microsoft MSN 
CAPTCHA was believed to be segmentation resistant.   
However, as the paper written by Jeff Yan (Jeff Yan, 2008) 
proves, a segmentation success rate of 92% can be achieved 
and this type of text-based CAPTCHA could be broken with a 
success rate of 60%. The 3D-CAPTCHA is another kind of 
text-based CAPTCHA, which was introduced to defeat OCR 
recognition attacks. However, as it has been pointed out by (Vu 
Duc Nguyen, 2014), they could break this kind of CAPTCHA 
with a high success rate. Additionally, audio-based 
CAPTCHAs were designed in order to be robust against 
computer sound recognition programs compared to text-based 
CAPTCHAs. Yet, as the results presented in (Yannis 
Soupionis, 2010) confirm, current audio-based CAPTCHA 
models are also highly vulnerable to bot attacks. 
Fig. 3 - A basic categorisation of CAPTCHAs 
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2.4. Security of CAPTCHAs 
Robustness and security of CAPTCHAs has been the centre 
of attention for researchers in the online and cyber security 
fields for many years.  As the number of online threats is 
growing at a high rate, the importance of making the 
CAPTCHA challenge more secure and robust is becoming 
even more critical.  Since OCR-based CAPTCHAs are the 
most vulnerable types, this section will focus on key aspects of 
their security (Jeff Yan, 2008).  As shown in (Vu Duc Nguyen, 
2014), most of the OCR-based CAPTCHAs have been broken 
using different recognition and segmentation techniques. 
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software is the electronic 
software used widely in order to convert hand written 
documents or typed glyphs and words into digital format. Most 
OCR recognition programs are based on pattern recognition 
techniques using vertical segmentation as a means to separate 
each glyph and character.  This is done in order to recognise 
every single character by comparing all of the pixels with pre-
stored characters on a database (Woodford, 2013). 
OCR recognition programs rely on different techniques in 
order to recognise characters or words.  Image preparation or 
pre-processing techniques are used to convert the image into 
greyscale or binary format. The pre-processing phase can also 
include background noise or line removal.  Segmentation is a 
technique to separate each glyph and character in order to 
analyse the pixel values for each separately, which are then 
matched with the characters pre-stored on the OCR database or 
a dictionary (Nicomsoft, 2012). Recognition (or pattern 
matching) is the final step that OCR programs use in order to 
match the separated characters to similar characters and glyphs 
stored on their database (which is dictionary-based). The 
different processes involved in the recognition of text-based 
CAPTCHAs are shown in Fig. 4. 
Segmentation is a very important procedure in any OCR 
recognition technique, and is needed in order to separate the 
characters from each other to make recognition possible. 
According to (Vu Duc Nguyen, 2014), there were a number of 
2D-CAPTCHA models believed to be segmentation-resistant. 
However, as the outcomes of Jeff Yan and Ahmad Salah El 
Ahmad have shown, most of the 2D-CAPTCHAs can be 
broken using vertical segmentation techniques (Jeff Yan, 
2008).  In the same paper, there is also another technique called 
pixel count, which counts the total number of the pixels in each 
chunk (segment) and by comparing the total number of the 
pixels with the character information on its database, it would 
easily map the corresponding character (Jeff Yan, 2009). 
 
Fig. 4 - Different phases involved in OCR recognition process 
According to (Vu Duc Nguyen, 2014), most of the text-
based CAPTCHAs have been broken using different image 
processing and pattern recognition algorithms.  As an example, 
the famous Google ReCAPTCHA is relevant to mention.  This 
was broken using a holistic approach of recognising the shape 
context of the words after applying character segmentation and 
recognition techniques (Vu Duc Nguyen, 2014). 
From this evidence, we can conclude that dictionary-based 
information causes dictionary attacks on these types of 
CAPTCHA. Therefore, in order to have a more secure and 
robust model, one of the steps we must consider is avoiding the 
use of a text string from a dictionary. In other words, if the 
presented information is random (instead of dictionary-based) 
it will make it much more difficult for the computer 
recognition program to decipher and recognise the entire 
CAPTCHA text (Yan, 2007; Jeff Yan, 2009).  In the past, 3D-
CAPTCHAs were assumed to be secure and robust because no 
OCR recognition software was able to break them directly. 
However, as shown in (Vu Duc Nguyen, 2014), 3D-
CAPTCHAs have also been broken using different filters and 
image-processing techniques with a high recognition success 
rate. Audio-based CAPTCHAs are also vulnerable to audio 
recognition techniques, as it has been discussed in (Yannis 
Soupionis, 2010). 
 
3. Proposed approach 
The previous sections of this paper have provided a brief 
introduction to CAPTCHA and online security, different types 
of CAPTCHAs in regards to their specifications, and also some 
of the main security aspects of CAPTCHA challenges. As it 
can be understood from the definition of CAPTCHA, the 
challenge should be designed in a way that makes it easy for 
human users to solve, but not be solvable for computer 
recognition programs (Luis von Ahn, 2004). Therefore, the 
usability and security of the CAPTCHA challenge poses a 
trade-off in CAPTCHA design. In fact, a CAPTCHA could 
even be very difficult for human users to solve (Saadat 
Beheshti & Liatsis, 2015).  In this section, a novel CAPTCHA 
model is introduced labelled VICAP (Visual Integration 
CAPTCHA) based on psychophysics and the properties of the 
human visual short-term memory (VSTM). This method would 
superimpose and integrate fleeting frames of visual information 
captured by the human eye in order to build the final image of 
an object in the brain.  This proposed model is designed to 
capitalise on a user’s sophisticated visual abilities, and 
therefore, it is logical to conclude that this proposed 
CAPTCHA model could demonstrate increased security 
against current computer recognition programs. 
3.1. Persistence of vision and CAPTCHA 
Currently, neuroscientists and psychologists believe that a 
key factor enabling us to see the world as integrated and 
continuous is a phenomenon called persistence of vision.  This 
is the core reason why the world around us does not turn to 
black with each blink of our eyes (Saadat Beheshti & Liatsis, 
2015). The term persistence of vision is the key element in any 
movie produced by the film industry and is the main reason 
why a film can be viewed as a smoothly running series of 
moving images. Every film is made up of a series of individual 
fleeting images (or frames).   By running these in front of the 
human eye, persistence of vision will cause an illusion so that 
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all of the individual frames form of an integrated and uniform 
shape in our visual system. Since persistence of vision is a 
unique characteristic of the human eye, we have utilised this 
distinctive ability in order to distinguish between real human 
users and automated computer bots. 
In order to have a better understanding of how persistence 
of vision works, we first need to look into the main causes of 
this phenomenon. Afterimage causes our visual system to 
remember the effect of every single image we see for a very 
short period of time in our Iconic Memory (IM), following the 
disappearance of the object from our sight (Clause, 2003- 
2014). This persistence can last for one tenth to one fifteenth of 
a second depending on different criteria such as image 
brightness, colour, and the angle of light (McKinney, 2008). 
According to research, Afterimage is the cause of 
persistence of vision in the brain. Studies dictate that normal 
and healthy human eyes cannot react or distinguish changes in 
light frequency in the visual system any faster than a certain 
period. Thus, the final outcomes will either not be noticeable to 
the human eye, or the changes in light frequency will be seen in 
an integrated form (Steven J. Luck, September 2008). 
As shown in Fig. 5 (David E. Irwin & Laura E. Thomas, 
2008) when stimulus is present, the human visual system can 
pick up the most information.  However, this visual sensory 
information will drop gradually after the stimulus disappears 
from our sight.  As it can be seen in Fig. 5, the quality of visual 
sensory information is at the maximum level within 0-50 
milliseconds after the stimulus offset and then it decreases 
rapidly. This quickly decaying function can explain the 
fundamentals of iconic memory and persistence of vision, as 
elaborated in (Steven J. Luck, September 2008). 
 
Fig. 5 - The graph represents the rapidly decaying function of visual 
sensory information following the stimulus offset (David E. Irwin & Laura 
E. Thomas, 2008) 
3.2. Persistence of vision and Temporal Integration 
Following this brief introduction about the procedure of 
persistence of vision and the functionality of iconic memory, 
we would now like to explain how the persistence of vision can 
cause the human visual system to see the world in an integrated 
and uniform fashion.  To explain this, we firstly need to refer to 
the definition of persistence of vision.  As the light from a 
stimulus arrives in the retinal part of our eyes, the effect of this 
light can be retained in our visual system for a brief fraction of 
a second before disappearing.  If a second stimulus is presented 
whilst the visual information of the first stimulus is still 
retained, the visual system will perceive the two stimuli as a 
single stimulus.  In psychophysics, this phenomenon is known 
as Temporal Integration.  According to (David E. Irwin & 
Laura E. Thomas, 2008), the visual information for each 
stimulus can persist for about 100-200 milliseconds after its 
offset.  However, this persistency can be affected by a number 
of factors, such as stimulus intensity, duration, and colour. 
Temporal Integration is known as the effect of two stimuli 
appearing with a very short delay, or Inter Stimulus Interval 
(ISI) from each other. In other words, ISI is defined as the 
distance between the offset of the first stimulus and the onset of 
the second stimulus.  
If the two stimuli are presented with a long ISI delay, then 
the visual sensory information for the first stimulus will already 
be wiped from our sight.  Therefore, there will be no 
integration happening with the second stimulus, as shown in 
Fig. 6.  However, when presenting the two stimuli with a very 
short ISI delay, a person will be able to see the results of two 
signals as one integrated signal, as shown in Fig. 7.  
 
 
Fig. 6 - Two stimuli are presented with a long ISI delay. As shown in the 
graph, there is no overlap between the two signals. This means that visual 
sensory information from the first stimulus is wiped completely before 
the presentation of the second stimulus. 
 
 
Fig. 7 - Two stimuli are presented with a very short ISI delay, and as a 
result, there will be some areas where two signals overlap each other. The 
overlapping areas will have some information from stimulus-1 and some 
from stimulus-2. 
As discussed previously, after the stimulus offset, some of 
the sensory information will still remain in the visual system 
for a very brief fraction of a second before completely 
disappearing (known as persistence of vision).  However, if the 
second stimulus is presented whilst the effects of the first 
stimulus remain, the human visual system will superimpose the 
two signals together and perceive them as one integrated 
image. The new image will contain characteristics from both 
stimuli (David E. Irwin & Laura E. Thomas, 2008; Steven J. 
Luck, September 2008). This action is called temporal 
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integration and the properties of this phenomenon are being 
used for the development of our proposed CAPTCHA model. 
3.3. Trans-Saccadic Visual Integration Technique 
As has already been acknowledged, persistence of vision 
causes temporal integration, which subsequently allows us to 
perceive the surrounding world in an integrated and continuous 
fashion.  In order to appreciate how the mechanism of temporal 
integration actually works, a novel scheme for temporal 
integration is proposed in this section, which will help us to 
understand how a sequence of images (or frames) are combined 
by the brain using trans-saccadic eye movements.  According 
to research, healthy human eyes are characterised by rapid eye 
movements, occurring about 3 to 5 times per second, which are 
known as saccadic eye movements. These last for 
approximately thirty milliseconds on average (Rayner, 1998; 
Irwin, Jun., 1996).  These rapid eye movements are necessary 
for our visual system in order to perceive a high quality image 
from the surrounding environment through integration and 
fusion of visual information. During trans-saccadic eye 
movements, there are intervals called fixations, which last for 
approximately 300 milliseconds (Irwin, Jun., 1996). During 
each fixation period, the fovea part of the eye focuses on a 
particular object and sends the visual information of the object 
to the brain in order to analyse and process the associated 
visual information.  Fixation periods are separated by rapid eye 
movements, called saccades.  
During each saccade, the visual information perceived 
during the fixation  𝑓(𝑖)  is combined and superimposed with 
the visual information from the previous fixation 𝑓(𝑖−1). This 
integration procedure takes place in a part of the memory 
module known as the trans-saccadic memory (Irwin, Jun., 
1996) (McKinney, 2008). Yet, in many studies, the trans-
saccadic memory has been mentioned to have the same 
characteristics as the human visual short-term memory 
(VSTM) (Steven J. Luck, September 2008; D. E. Irwin, 1991). 
According to (Irwin, Jun., 1996), human working memory is 
able to process information of 3 to 4 saccades at one time.  
Therefore, in order to build a stable visual impression of the 
environment (or a scene), repetition of the visual information is 
required. In order to better explain how the proposed trans-
saccadic integration scheme works, the following section will 
consider this scheme under two scenarios. 
3.3.1. Single stage scenario 
As discussed previously, in order to see a video clip 
smoothly without flashing images, all the images need to be 
presented in such a way so as to enable our visual system to 
integrate and superimpose them. To achieve this goal, the 
visual information perceived during one fixation period needs 
to be combined with the visual information perceived during 
the subsequent fixation period. Fig. 8 (Saadat Beheshti & 
Liatsis, 2015) shows the proposed processing scheme for trans-
saccadic integration, which takes place in a human’s short-term 
memory. The proposed model starts with perceiving visual 
information from our environment during a fixation period 𝑓(𝑖).  
This fixation period lasts for about 300 milliseconds and is 
known as visual information acquisition. All the visual 
information received during each fixation period is stored into 
the iconic memory for a very short period of time before the 
information is passed to the short-term (or working) memory.  
With each saccade, the visual information stored in the iconic 
memory will be passed to the working memory in order to be 
integrated with the pre-stored visual information from the 
previous fixations , 𝜆𝑔(𝑖−1) . In visual psychophysics, this 
procedure is called trans-saccadic integration. Another 
important procedure that takes place during each saccade is the 
erasing of the iconic memory so as to prepare it for receiving 
new visual information from the eye. 
 
Fig. 8 - The procedure of visual information integration using Trans-
Saccadic Memory (Saadat Beheshti & Liatsis, 2015) 
3.3.2. Multi stage scenario 
As can be seen in Fig. 8, in order to see the world in an 
integrated and continuous form, the process of temporal 
integration needs to be repeated. The output image 𝑔(𝑖) is the 
result of superimposing a series of frames, which were 
perceived during the previous fixation periods, multiplied by a 
weight, known as forgetting factor 𝜆, which can be described 
as follows: 
(1) 𝑔(𝑖) =  𝜆𝑔(𝑖−1) + 𝑓(𝑖) 
Where, 0 < 𝜆 ≤ 1  is the forgetting factor which will 
allocate exponentially less weight to the older samples. The 
term 𝜆𝑔(𝑖−1) refers to the weighted outcome of the previous 
integration of the fixations. In the model, older samples are 
allocated a lower weight, and therefore, the influence of their 
visual information will automatically diminish.  By iteratively 
expanding Equation (1) and substituting the associated terms, 
we obtain the formula below for a number of 𝑛 fixations: 
(2) 𝑔(𝑛) =  ∑ 𝜆(𝑛−𝑖)𝑛𝑖=0  𝑓
(𝑖) 
Equation (2) shows how fleeting images will produce the 
final image in the visual system using the trans-saccadic visual 
integration technique. As we can see, consecutive frame 
sequence A = {𝐹1, 𝐹2, 𝐹3, … , 𝐹𝑛} is being run at high speed and 
the human visual system is able to integrate and superimpose 
all the fleeted frames during different fixation periods in order 
to produce the final image. Since every single image (or frame) 
will be retained in our iconic memory for a very short period of 
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time before being wiped from our memory, it has to be 
repeated many times in order to for our memory system to 
remember and memorise the sequence for a very short period 
of time (in milliseconds). This process of repeating images 
causes our visual system to distinguish between variations of 
pixel frequencies.  Consequently, the user will recognise the 
combination image.  
Every single frame is made up of a number of random 
pixels, some of them belonging to the object, while others are 
background noise. As mentioned earlier, this approach uses a 
number of consecutive frames (𝐹1, 𝐹2, 𝐹3, …) in the sequence 
“A”.  These are run fleetingly, and every single image will be 
retained in the visual memory before disappearing due to the 
effect of persistence of vision.  This will cause the human 
visual system to combine all seen images and ‘reconstruct’ the 
final image, which is the superposition of the previous 
sequence.  
 
4. Proposed CAPTCHA model 
The proposed CAPTCHA model is based on the abilities of 
the human visual system to retain and superimpose the images 
of a sequence in order to make up the final image of an object. 
The aim of this section is to explain the fundamentals of the 
VICAP security model and the different procedures involved in 
this model in order to increase the security of websites and 
online service providers. Two different approaches to this 
CAPTCHA design will be presented.  In the first CAPTCHA 
model (version 1.0), the application only produces frames that 
hold key information about the object.  This model has some 
weaknesses, which will be discussed in due course. The second 
approach (version 2.0) was created in order to increase the 
robustness of the VICAP model against automated computer 
attacks, and as will be shown, provided a success rate of over 
90%.  In other words, it was 90% successful against not being 
recognizable by current automated computer recognition 
programs. 
 
4.1. VICAP version 1.0 
In order to generate the VICAP output frames sequence, the 
CAPTCHA-Generator application (CGA) was developed using 
.NET programming tools, running on a 64-bit Windows 
operating system with Intel Core-i5 CPU and 3.20 GHz 
processing power. The main role of the CAPTCHA-Generator 
application is to render individual VICAP images based on the 
specific criteria, which will be discussed below, and play them 
back in a sequence of frames consecutively and smoothly for 
users in order to produce a film/animation effect. In order to 
develop the proposed model, a string of characters and 
numbers are randomly selected from a database. The VICAP 
model uses a combination of five characters and numbers. 
Since this combination is selected on a random basis, it will not 
be possible for the computer programs to guess, as in the case 
of dictionary-based attacks. The string of characters to be used 
by the CAPTCHA-Generator application is made up of 18 
letters as follows: {A, C, E, F, H, K, L, M, N, P, R, S, T, U, V, 
W, X, Y} and 6 numbers as follows: {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}. In total, 
there will be 24 different characters/numbers to be selected 
randomly by the program. 
As can be easily seen, some letters and numbers have been 
avoided due to the ambiguities that they would cause. For 
example, in many cases, the letter “B” can be mistaken with 
number “8” and vice versa. Another case is letter “O” which 
can cause ambiguity with the number “0”, and also the letter 
“Z” which can be confused with the number “2”. For more 
information on CAPTCHA usability issues please refer to the 
work by (Saadat Beheshti & Liatsis, 2015). The procedure of 
generating the VICAP model consists of the following three 
steps: 
A. Binarization and bitmap conversion: 
 Binarization is the procedure of converting all pixel values 
to a binary value (0 or 1), expressed as 1 bit/pixel, which will 
produce a black and white image.  During this process, the grey 
level of a pixel is compared to a threshold and is allocated the 
value of zero/one if it is less/greater than the threshold, thus 
corresponding to black/white, respectively.  It is important to 
convert the pixel values to their binary equivalents because this 
will simplify the subsequent steps in order to create the final 
CAPTCHA image.  Additionally, the human eye is more 
sensitive to black and white, rather than colour, stimuli.  This is 
due to the presence of a large number of rods, which are 
photoreceptors in the retina sensitive to shades of grey, rather 
than cones, which are sensitive to colour. Moreover, using 
colour CAPTCHA images may have a negative effect on the 
usability and security of the CAPTCHA, as it may increase the 
risk of CAPTCHA attacks (Saadat Beheshti & Liatsis, 2015). 
B. Object sampling rate:  
Since the proposed VICAP model is based on the ability of 
the human eye to differentiate between the total number of 
object pixels and background noise pixels, it is important to 
choose the correct ratio for the object sampling rate and also 
the superposition of background noise. In the proposed 
CAPTCHA model, the object-sampling rate has been chosen in 
a way that makes it very easy for the human eye to distinguish 
between the density of object pixels and background noise. 
However, it is impossible for computer recognition programs to 
distinguish these two aspects from each other. The sampling 
rate of the object pixels is random, and therefore, it would be 
almost impossible for computer programs to predict or learn 
the behaviour of the pixel elements in terms of appearing or 
disappearing. Fig. 9 shows an object corresponding to 
character “O”, made of 𝑁2 number of pixels, where 𝑋 
represents the number of object pixels. In this example, there is 
a total of [𝑁2 − 𝑋] background pixels. 
 
Fig. 9 - An example of a complete object corresponding to the character 
“O” prior to the application of sampling. 
By sampling the object at a rate of 𝑆%, there will only be a 
partial section of the object presented to the user. Since the 
procedure of the sampling is based on the random generator 
function, the presentation of the pixels varies from frame to 
frame.  However, overall, the total number of the pixels almost 
stays the same.  For instance, as it is shown in Fig. 10, the 
object “O” has been sampled at a 50% sampling rate, which 
means the probability of every single pixel appearing in that 
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frame is almost equal to 50%. Thus, on the single frame 
scenario there will only be half of the pixels appearing for the 
object “O” and another 50% of the object pixels will not be 
shown at all. However, the combination of the pixels can vary 
from frame to frame, as shown in Fig. 11. 
 
 
 
This model is based on persistence of vision and the ability 
of a human’s supreme visual system to hold information for a 
very short period of seconds using iconic memory.  
Consequently, by presenting only a portion of the object pixels 
in each single frame and by playing all the frames 
consecutively, our visual system would be able to combine all 
the fleeting images and by superimposing the frames together, 
it will be able to create the final image in the brain. 
C. Adding background noise to the CAPTCHA image: 
The final step in creating the CAPTCHA images is 
injecting background noise to the sampled object 𝑋. This action 
will make the CAPTCHA images even harder for optical 
character recognition (OCR) software to realise or recognise 
the characters or objects. Since the pixels are randomly selected 
and presented in each single image it will, in practice, be 
almost impossible to predict or guess the possible combinations 
of the pixels in order to extract the final image. As shown in 
Fig. 12, some amount of background noise is added to the 
sampled object 𝑋 at a percentage of 𝑛%.  
 
Fig. 12 - Injecting background noise to the sampled object 𝑿  at the 
percentage of 𝒏% 
Fig. 13 shows an example of the three steps involved in 
generating a single VICAP frame.  As it can be seen, step A is 
producing the binary image of the original data. Step B is the 
sampling of the object (for instance at a 20% rate in this 
example), and step C is injecting background noise (at a rate of 
15% in this example).  After generating the VICAP frames, the 
next step is presenting the CAPTCHA images at an appropriate 
animation speed for human users to perceive them as a 
continuous sequence using the persistence of vision effect.  The 
CAPTCHA-Generator Application is used to render individual 
images with the required specifications (such as background 
noise and object sampling rates) and subsequently playback the 
CAPTCHA sequence for the user. 
 
Fig. 13 - Steps involved in generating a single VICAP frame. 
 
As it can be seen from the above example, there is an 
important issue that needs to be addressed here: namely, the 
relationship between the object sampling rate (OSR) and the 
background noise rate (BNR). The key issue here, which we 
would like to capitalise on, is the appropriate choosing of the 
density of the object pixels compared to the background noise.  
By doing this, we could enable the human visual system to 
distinguish between object pixels and background noise. 
Therefore, it is absolutely vital to determine the appropriate 
ratio of OSR/BNR as a means to integrate the noisy 
information presented in the individual frames to ensure 
usability, whilst balancing the security aspects of the 
CAPTCHA in order to maintain robustness to computer 
program attacks. Fig. 14 represents 441 experimental results 
measuring the impact that different combinations of object 
sampling rate (OSR) and background noise ratio (BNR) have in 
relation to the computer character recognition rate on the 
VICAP images.  Every value presented in this table is based on 
the average value for 10 randomly selected CAPTCHA images. 
These, after being superimposed and rendered using the 
CAPTCHA-Test Application1 have been passed on to the OCR 
recognition program. In total (10 x 441 =) 4410 CAPTCHA 
experiments have been conducted, and the results are presented 
as their average value in the above table.  
A) Simulation Results (version-1):  
As it can be observed from Fig. 14, this research includes 
over 4000 simulation experiments, which were conducted 
using a variety of object sampling rates and background noise 
levels in order to examine the impact on the final output image 
in terms of computer recognition levels.  In order to achieve 
this, the OSR was selected at a rate of 0% to begin with and 
then increased by 5% granularity until it reached 100%. 
Similarly, the background noise levels started at 0% and were 
increased by 5% until they reached 100%.   
                                                          
1 CAPTCHA-Test Application is the state-of-the-art application and 
was developed as a part of PhD project in order to simulate and 
render a final superimposed image of the individual VICAP frames in 
order to test and measure the security and robustness level of the 
proposed CAPTCHA model. 
Fig. 10 - Object “O” is sampled at 50% 
Fig. 11 - Sampling of object “O” at the same sampling rate of 50%, but 
with a different pixel combination. 
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 All output results were generated using one of the most 
sophisticated CAPTCHA breaker programs, called GSA 
CAPTCHA Breaker (GSA, 2014), which uses three different 
OCR engines in order to recognise every single character and 
number.  It also has one of the most advanced databases, and is 
able to break the majority of current CAPTCHAs with over a 
success rate of over 99% (GSA, 2014). By applying GSA 
Captcha Breaker, the performance of some of the most popular 
CAPTCHA decoders such as DeCaptcher, DeathByCaptcha, 
Bypass Captcha is evaluated on the proposed CAPTCHA 
model (GSA, 2016). The above named CAPTCHA attacks will 
be discussed more in details in the section 5.1 VICAP security 
analysis. 
Fig. 15 represents examples of 10 different output frames 
generated by the VICAP-Generator application. Due to space 
limitations, we are not able to show the final output effect. This 
has to be experienced in the real world. Interested readers may 
experience the proposed model on the CAPTCHA evaluation 
and user experience website at: 
http://mrbeheshti2.wixsite.com/captcha/vicap 
 
Fig. 15 - Example of ten different output frames generated and rendered 
by the VICAP-Generator Application with 15% background noise and 
25% object sampling rates. The user would be able to see the string of 
“AE34M” easily, while there is no information that can be seen by 
analysing individual frames. 
Iconic memory is known as a key factor that causes 
persistence of vision. Forming the final object based on the 
presentation of a series of frames depends on the difference in 
the density of the object pixels and background pixels. The way 
our visual system can distinguish between these two sets of 
pixels is by analysing the density of all presented pixels in a 
single frame basis, and then capturing the initial frame in the 
iconic memory and comparing it with the subsequent frame. As 
it can be understood from Equation (1) and (2) in the section 
3.3.2, in order for the human eye to distinguish between the 
object pixels and the background noise pixels, the whole 
process of displaying the CAPTCHA frames needs to be 
repeated. This process of repeating will cause our visual system 
to distinguish between pixel density of the object and 
background noise. Subsequently, based on the density 
information of the pixels, the human eye would be able to 
recognise the final object. However, the main question raised 
here is: what if a computer program also compares the 
individual pixel frequencies in terms of multiple frames? By 
mapping these frequency values to the location of the pixels, in 
practice, the computer program would be able to reconstruct 
the object too. 
To address this problem, the proposed CAPTCHA model 
has been tested using the CAPTCHA-Test Application. This 
application would work in a very similar way to the human 
visual system. It could calculate the pixel occurrence 
frequencies according to the weight of each pixel, and by 
mapping the output results against different shades of grey, the 
application would be able to simulate the final image of the 
object in greyscale (8-bit/pixel) as well as 1-bit/pixel in a black 
and white image.  
This task will be done by making a graphical representation 
of the most frequent pixels by analysing the pixel value based 
on a single frame, and then expanding the calculation to the rest 
of the frames.  In this experiment, we have chosen 10 
consecutive frames. Thus, as it can be observed from Fig. 16 
(VICAP version 1.0) the developed application is easily able to 
retrieve the hidden information from 10 different CAPTCHA 
frames shown in Fig. 15, and can recover the final object image 
very clearly.  This is a significant weakness of the first 
generation model. For this reason, the second CAPTCHA 
design (version 2.0) was generated in order to overcome this 
recognition problem. 
Fig. 14 - Comparison of different object sampling rates-OSR (horizontal rows) vs. backgrounds noise ratio-BNR (vertical columns) and the output 
results in terms of computer recognition success rate (in percentage). 
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Fig. 16 - Final integrated output result from superimposing 10 
CAPTCHA frames shown as an 8-bit/pixel greyscale image. String of 
“AE34M” can be clearly retrieved by OCR recognition software using 
CAPTCHA v.1. 
4.2. VICAP version 2.0 
In the second CAPTCHA model, the process of generating 
CAPTCHA frames is very similar to the first model, with the 
only difference being that in the second model, there will be 
two production lines working concurrently. In the production 
line-1, the CAPTCHA images (which are original frames 
containing object information, shown using symbol “𝑂”) are 
generated with the same procedure as before, while at the same 
time in the production line-2, random frames (shown using 
symbol “𝑅”) are generated, containing random pixels at a rate 
of 𝑛.  Where 𝑛 is chosen is the same value as the background 
noise rate in the CAPTCHA frames of production line-1. Since 
both pixel frames (background from production line-1 and 
production line-2) are generated from the same random process 
(and thus have the same characteristics), they become 
indistinguishable. This increases the robustness of the model.  
There is currently no available recognition software that is able 
to distinguish between these two series. An example of these 
two series of frame generator engines is given below: 
(3) Production line-1:   𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 =
 {𝑂1, 𝑂2, 𝑂3, … , 𝑂𝑚} 
(4) Production line-2:   𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 =
 {𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, … , 𝑅𝑚} 
Here, a key parameter is introduced called Original-to-
Random Output (ORO) frames, which plays a key role in the 
second CAPTCHA design. This defines the properties of the 
mixing procedure, by specifying the percentage of random and 
original frames in the final sequence. A higher percentage of 
ORO translates to a larger number of original frames and a 
smaller number of random frames being mixed together in the 
sequence, and vice versa. An example of how ORO can be 
used to mix these two series of frames is shown below: 
(5) 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
 {𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑶𝟏, 𝑅4, 𝑶𝟐, 𝑅5, … } 
As it can be observed from Equation 5, the original frames 
are being mixed randomly with random frames with 𝑂𝑅𝑂 ≃
30%. The mixing procedure is performed on a random basis. 
Therefore, in practice, it would not be possible to detect the 
ordering of the frames as a means to separate original frames 
from random ones. However, the superior properties of the 
human visual system are able to superimpose the structured 
information in the presented frames, and thus distinguish the 
object from the background noise. Fig. 18 shows an example of 
the final output frames generated and rendered using an object-
sampling rate of 25%, a background noise rate of 15%, and an 
ORO parameter set to 20%. As it can be seen from Fig. 18, by 
analysing every single frame, no useful information can be 
observed.  Yet, by running all frames at high speed, it is 
possible for the human visual system to recognise the hidden 
object in the frame sequence. 
B) Simulation Results (version 2):  
As discussed previously, having different background noise 
and object sampling rates affects the level of robustness of the 
proposed CAPTCHA model. Thus, as shown in Fig. 17, an 
object-sampling rate of 25% and a background noise rate of 
15% from the VICAP version 1 give a computer recognition 
success rate of 50%. When introducing the VICAP version 2, 
the computer recognition success rate drops rapidly to near 0%, 
as shown in Fig. 19 and Fig. 20. The final simulation output 
results for the computer recognition success rate for VICAP 
version 2 is shown in the Fig. 19 and Fig. 20 using the 
CAPTCHA-Test Application for 8-bit/pixel greyscale format 
and 1-bit/pixel black and white format. As shown in these 
Figures, no useful information can be retrieved from the series 
of frames and thus, it is expected that the computer recognition 
rate is almost close to 0%. 
 
Fig. 17 - The table shows a 25% object sampling rate and a 15% 
background noise rate will give rise to a 50% risk of VICAP v.1 being 
defeated by computer character recognition software. 
 
   
   
   
   
   
Fig. 18 – An example of 10 individual CAPTCHA frames generated and 
rendered by the VICAP-generator application with a 15% background 
noise and a 25% object sampling rate and ORO=20%. 
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Fig. 19 – The final integrated output result from superimposing 10 
CAPTCHA frames shown as an 8-bit/pixel greyscale image. No useful 
information can be retrieved in the second scenario. 
 
Fig. 20 – The final integrated output result from superimposing 10 
CAPTCHA frames shown as a 1-bit/pixel black and white image. No 
useful information can be retrieved in the second scenario. 
 
5. Evaluation results and discussion 
 
5.1. VICAP security analysis 
As discussed previously, the level of distinguishability of 
the letters and numbers in the proposed CAPTCHA model 
directly depends on the value of the ORO parameter, as it 
defines the recognition success rate for both human users and 
computer recognition software (OCR). In this section, the 
VICAP v.2 model was tested using different techniques and 
under different conditions for both human users as well as 
computer recognition software in order to determine the 
optimal level for the ORO parameter. This translates to the 
threshold value for which the CAPTCHA is easily recognizable 
and visible for the human users, but at the same time it is 
difficult (if not impossible) for computer attackers to recognize. 
5.1.1 Computer recognition success rate experimental 
results (CRSR) 
In order to measure the level of robustness and security of 
the proposed CAPTCHA model, various experiments were 
conducted in laboratory conditions using a computer with Intel 
Core-i5 CPU and 3.20 GHz processor. 200 attacks were 
simulated using the state of the art GSA-Captcha Breaker 
(GSA, 2014). The aim of these experiments was to determine 
the resistance level (or threshold value) of the proposed VICAP 
model against different computer recognition attacks. The 
experiments began with ORO = 0% and the computer 
recognition success rate was measured for every single 
experiment. Then, the granularity of ORO increased by 10% 
until it reached 100% to complete the whole test. To generate 
statistically meaningful results, for every single setting of the 
ORO parameter, a chunk of 20 randomly generated 
CAPTCHAs were fed to the GSA-CAPTCHA Breaker 
application.  Thus, a total of 200 experiments were conducted.  
The final proposed CAPTCHA model is based on the 
processes of persistence vision and also the properties of 
temporal integration.  After playing back and analyzing the 
individual frame information, no useful information could be 
retrieved. Thus, on an individual frame basis, the model is 
100% secure against any current character recognition 
application for two main reasons.  Firstly, the characters and 
numbers are completely faded into background noise using 
sampling techniques (refer to section 4.1.C of this paper). 
Consequently, every single frame is made up of random dots 
(or black pixels) which, on their own, have no meaning. 
Secondly, the way OCR programs recognize text is by firstly 
segmenting the characters, and then recognizing them.  Since 
the letters and numbers in our model are sampled, only a 
portion of their pixels appear in each frame, which may not 
carry sufficient information about the object.  So, OCR may 
not be able to segment the VICAP frames.  The only possible 
way to attack this CAPTCHA model is to superimpose the 
information in the frames in a very similar way to our own 
visual system. 
For this reason, in order to test the proposed CAPTCHA 
model, we need to simulate a final output image, which 
implements the integration rules of Equations (1) and (2). In 
order to get the final simulation output results, we have used 
our CAPTCHA-Test Application. As discussed previously, the 
ORO threshold value is the key parameter that is being tested 
and evaluated in this section. In order to better understand how 
the ORO parameter can affect the visibility and 
distinguishability of the characters and numbers in VICAP v.2, 
some of the superimposed output results are presented in Fig. 
21 to Fig. 25. As it can be observed from the output results, the 
distinguishability of the characters is at the lowest level when 
the ORO parameter is about 10% and gradually increases as the 
value of ORO parameter increases accordingly. 
 
Fig. 21 - Superimposition rendered output image with ORO = 10%. 
 
Fig. 22 - Superimposition rendered output image with ORO = 30%. 
 
Fig. 23 - Superimposition rendered output image with ORO = 50%. 
 
Fig. 24 - Superimposition rendered output image with ORO = 70%. 
 
Fig. 25 - Superimposition rendered output image with ORO = 90%. 
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In order to measure the security and robustness levels of the 
proposed CAPTCHA model v.2, 200 experiments have been 
conducted in the same laboratory conditions as explained 
before. Every single experiment consisted of superimposing 
images of 10 randomly selected VICAP frames with a specific 
ORO value as shown above. Ten different ration of ORO 
parameter (from zero to 100%) and 20 randomly rendered and 
superimposed VICAP images per ratio were tested.  Thus, a 
total of 200 different VICAP security experiments have been 
conducted. As stated before, individual VICAP frames were 
rendered and generated using state of the art VICAP-Generator 
Application and after that, every group of frames were 
superimposed into a single image using the CAPTCHA-Test 
Application. 
After rendering and generating 200 different superimposed 
CAPTCHA images using the CAPTCHA-Test Application, 
these were passed on to the GSA-CAPTCHA Breaker in order 
to measure the security and robustness levels for each of the 
experiments individually. As Fig. 26 shows, the GSA-
CAPTCHA Breaker was able to break our proposed model 
with a success rate of 100%, when ORO = 90% in about 35 
seconds. As the value of ORO parameter dropped, the 
probability of mixing original frames with random frames also 
decreased. As the number of original frames dropped, less 
information about the object was presented. Therefore, it would 
be more difficult for computer recognition software to decipher 
useful information and subsequently, this would translate to a 
reduced recognition success rate for automated computer 
programs. Fig. 27 shows that computer recognition attacks are 
not able to break our proposed CAPTCHA model when the 
ORO parameter is equal to 20% or less. 
 
Fig. 26 Screenshot of the GSA-CAPTCHA Breaker Application. VICAP 
is recognised by the CAPTCHA breaker application with a percentage of 
Original-to-Random Output frames (ORO) = 90%, with a recognition 
success rate of 100%. 
 
 
Fig. 27 - Screenshot of the GSA-CAPTCHA Breaker application. The 
application is not able to retrieve any information from the object and in 
this case the recognition success rate = 0% at ORO = 20%.  
Table 1 represents the comparison of different ORO values 
and the corresponding computer recognition success rates. As 
the table shows, the value of ORO parameter can directly affect 
the computer recognition success rate in a way that by 
increasing the ORO parameter, the computer recognition rate 
would also increase. There would be a threshold value 
(highlighted in the table in green) which is determined to be 
ORO = 20% in this experiment, where the computer 
recognition success rate equals 0%. This threshold value plays 
a key role in this experiment, as for values of ORO > 20% 
computer recognition attacks will be able to break the proposed 
CAPTCHA model. Therefore, as we can see from Table 1, 
there is a significant jump in terms of computer recognition 
success rate, going from 0% to 20% when ORO increases from 
20% to 30%. 
Table 1. Comparison of computer recognition success rate versus 
Original-to-Random Output frame (ORO) parameter. 
ORO 
Parameters 
Computer 
Recognition Success Rate 
0% 0% 
10% 0% 
20% 0% 
30% 20% 
40% 50% 
50% 80% 
60% 90% 
70% 100% 
80% 100% 
90% 100% 
100% 100% 
 
In order to find out whether the sharp jump in terms of 
CRSR in the range of ORO from 20% to 30% is instantaneous 
or a gradual, we ran an extensive series of new experiments 
under the same laboratory conditions as explained previously 
under two scenarios, 1- Individual characters and 2- Entire 
CAPTCHA string, as it is explained below. 
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Scenario 1: (Individual Characters) 
In this experiment, the recognition success rate for 
computer character recognition programs was evaluated using 
220 randomly generated VICAP images, containing 
combination of five randomly selected letters or numbers. Each 
superimposed VICAP image was rendered using the Captcha-
Test application and in total 20 randomly generated and 
superimposed VICAP images were tested for each value of 
ORO. The percentage increase in ORO values was set to 1%, 
thus resulting in 220 VICAP rendered images in the ORO 
range between 20% to 30%. In the first scenario, we measured 
the output results in regards to providing the correct response 
for a single character rather than the entire CAPTCHA. As it 
can be seen from the output results, as the value of ORO 
increases, so does the CRSR value.  It is interesting to note that 
up to a value of ORO equal to 26%, computer recognition rates 
are at 0%, however from this value onwards there is a non-
linear relationship in terms of the increase of CRSR. This is 
exemplified by the massive jump from 29% to 30%, where 
CRSR quadruples. The output results for CRSR for individual 
characters are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. The change of CRSR per individual characters for 
variation of ORO parameters 
ORO Parameters CRSR for Individual Character 
20% 0% 
21% 0% 
22% 0% 
23% 0% 
24% 0% 
25% 0% 
26% 0% 
27% 1% 
28% 3% 
29% 7% 
30% 28% 
 
Scenario 2: (Entire CAPTCHA String) 
The purpose of the second experiment is to evaluate 
computer recognition success rates in the context of 
deciphering the entire CAPTCHA, rather than simply 
considering partial recognition of a string of five individual 
characters and numbers. As in the previous experiment, we set 
the percentage increase in terms of ORO to 1%, and created a 
test database of 20 randomly generated and superimposed 
VICAP images for each ORO value, resulting to a total of 220 
images. As expected, computer recognition rates of a 
CAPTCHA string are lower than those of individual characters. 
Specifically, up to an ORO level of 29%, CRSR is at 0%, 
followed by a step increase to 20% at an ORO rate of 30% as 
shown in Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. The change of CRSR for entire CAPTCHA string for 
variation of ORO parameters 
ORO Parameters CRSR for Entire CAPTCHA  
20% 0% 
21% 0% 
22% 0% 
23% 0% 
24% 0% 
25% 0% 
26% 0% 
27% 0% 
28% 0% 
29% 0% 
30% 20% 
In order to enhance the accuracy of the final recognition 
output results in terms of computer attacks, the proposed 
CAPTCHA model was tested against most popular CAPTCHA 
attacks. As it was explained previously, “GSA Captcha 
Breaker” is a software that uses three different OCR engines in 
order to recognise every single character and number. “Captcha 
Sniper” is another type of CAPTCHA decoder that works very 
similarly to “GSA Captcha breaker” and both of them are 
based on the same concept. By applying “Captcha Sniper” and 
“GSA Captcha breaker”, the performance of some of the most 
popular CAPTCHA decoders such as DeCaptcher, 
DeathByCaptcha, Bypass Captcha is evaluated on the proposed 
CAPTCHA model (Anon., 2016) (GSA, 2016). The table 
below represents some of the output results made from the 
experiments using the named CAPTCHA decoders. 
Table 4. Recognition output results for different CAPTCHA 
decoders 
CAPTCHA 
Decoder 
ORO 
Output Rendered 
VICAP Image 
RSR       
Recognition 
Success 
Rate 
Recognised 
Answer 
GSA Captcha 
Breaker 
20% 
 
0% Null 
Captcha Sniper 20% 
 
0% Null 
DeCaptcher 20% 
 
0% Null 
DeathByCaptcha 20% 
 
0% Null 
Bypass Captcha 20% 
 
0% Null 
5.1.2. Human recognition success rate experimental 
results (HRSR) 
In previous experiments, we measured the highest threshold 
value for the ORO parameter that would give 0% for computer 
recognition programs to break our proposed CAPTCHA model. 
Any CAPTCHA model should satisfy two conditions in order 
to be considered valid: namely, as acknowledged, be too 
difficult or impossible for computers to break and very easy for 
humans to solve.  Therefore, another set of experiments should 
be repeated for human users in order to find the threshold value 
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for the ORO parameter that would enable human users to 
recognize the CAPTCHA very easily.  
The aim of running these series of experiments is to find the 
optimal level for ORO parameter that gives the best possible 
distinguishability level of the CAPTCHA for human users, and 
the minimum level of recognition success rates for computer 
programs. In order to run the second experiment, the 
CAPTCHA User Evaluation Website2 was designed to enable 
users to participate in VICAP model evaluation and provide 
their feedback regarding usability and distinguishability. In 
total, 150 participants from different age groups and 
backgrounds participated in the experiment through this 
website. The website is designed in such way that every time a 
user visits the website, a new set of random characters and 
numbers is generated and displayed to them by recording the IP 
address of the user. 
Feedback from the 150 participants was collected and the 
average value for each grade of the ORO parameter was 
calculated, based on the ability of the users to see and recognise 
the CAPTCHA challenge. Table 5 shows a comparison of 10 
different ORO parameters and their associated human 
recognition success rates. As it can be seen from the table, the 
test is run at ORO = 0%, where there are no original frames 
presented and therefore, no useful information is presented to 
the users. Consequently, as we can see from the results, the 
human recognition success rate is also equal to 0%. By 
increasing the value of the ORO parameter, the recognition 
success rate for the users also increases rapidly. However, as 
the experimental results can confirm, the sophisticated 
recognition abilities of the human visual system react more 
sharply and accurately than computer recognition programs. As 
it can be deduced from Table 5, for ORO < 20%, the 
recognition success rate is almost equal to 0%. This means that 
for ORO < 20%, there is no sufficient information about the 
object and it is difficult for human users to see and recognise it. 
However, as the results from Table 5 show, the first big jump in 
terms of the human recognition success rate is at ORO = 20%, 
which gives a recognition success rate of 65% as highlighted in 
the table. Surprisingly, in the second experiment similar to the 
first, the threshold value is measured at ORO = 20%, where 
there is the first big jump in terms recognition success rate for 
the human users. 
Table 5. Comparison of different Original-to-Random Output 
(ORO) frame rate parameter and the effect of human recognition 
success rate. 
ORO 
Parameters 
Human 
Recognition Success Rate 
0% 0% 
10% 0% 
20% 65% 
30% 80% 
40% 100% 
50% 100% 
60% 100% 
70% 100% 
80% 100% 
90% 100% 
100% 100% 
                                                          
2 The CAPTCHA user evaluation website is accessible at 
http://mrbeheshti2.wixsite.com/captcha/vicap 
In order to enhance our output results, we would like to 
conduct another series of user experiments to determine 
whether the sharp jump in HRSR in the range of ORO values 
between 10% to 20% is instantaneous or follows a gradual 
increase. For this reason, the CAPTCHA user evaluation 
website was used as in the previous experiments. Over 50 
participants participated in this CAPTCHA user experience 
evaluation tests. The feedback provided by the participants was 
collected and the output results are analysed and discussed in 
the two scenarios as explained below. 
Scenario 1: (Individual Characters) 
In this experiment, we are concerned with human 
recognition success rates under the individual character 
scenario. We set the percentage increase of ORO to 1%, so as 
to better capture the nature of the human recognition 
performance. The range of ORO values for this experiment is 
between 10% to 20%. Table 6 summarizes the findings of our 
research.  
Table 6. The change of HRSR for individual characters for 
variation of ORO parameters 
ORO Parameters HRSR for Individual Characters 
10% 0% 
11% 0% 
12% 0% 
13% 4% 
14% 8% 
15% 12% 
16% 20% 
17% 28% 
18% 40% 
19% 56% 
20% 84% 
As the final output results confirm, up to an ORO level of 
12%, HRSR is 0%, however following this level, there is a 
nearly linear increase for an ORO rate up to 17%. For values 
higher than 18%, human users were able to recognise the single 
character CAPTCHAs with good accuracy, rising to 84% at 
ORO of 20%. 
Scenario 2: (Entire CAPTCHA String) 
By analysing the output feedback received from the 
participants in Scenario 1, we focused our attention in 
evaluating human recognition success rates for string 
CAPTCHAs. As the final output results from over 50 
participants confirm, the recognition success rates for ORO 
values up to 19% were equal to 0%. This means that no 
participants were able to recognise the entire CAPTCHA 
string, when the ORO parameter is less than 19%. This is 
consistent with the results of the previous experiment, where 
recognition rates of individual characters in this range were 
quite low for human users. At an ORO rate of 20%, HRSR 
suddenly jumps to 60%, which translates to some CAPTCHAs 
being deciphered completely by the majority of participants as 
shown in Table 7. Nevertheless, this is still lower than the 84% 
recognition accuracy achieved in the case of individual 
character scenario, shown in Table 6 of experiment 2. 
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Table 7. The change of HRSR for entire CAPTCHA string for 
variation of ORO parameters 
ORO Parameters HRSR for Entire CAPTCHA String 
10% 0% 
11% 0% 
12% 0% 
13% 0% 
14% 0% 
15% 0% 
16% 0% 
17% 0% 
18% 0% 
19% 0% 
20% 60% 
In orde to justify this big jump in term of HRSR, we can 
compare the output results from indivual recgtion rate and 
entire CAPTCHA recognition rate. By looking at the analytical 
results it can be undrestant that in the case of ORO equals and 
less than 19%, only partial information was readable by the 
human users and none of the partipants were able to decode the 
entire CAPTCHA. Thereofe, the HRSR for the entire 
CAPTCHA string becomes 0%. Hoever, by increasing the 
value of ORO to 20%, therfore will be sufficient original 
frames to present to the user inroder to form the final object in 
the bran. Thus, the entire CAPTCHA becomes more readable 
for majority of the users. The output results for ORO = 20% 
was indicating that  3 out of 5 users were able to answer the 
entire CAPTCHA correcly which produce HRSR = 60%. 
5.1.3. ORO analytical comparison 
The proposed CAPTCHA model is designed specifically to 
work in collaboration with the human visual system; therefore, 
the expectation is to get better and more accurate results for 
humans rather than computers. Fig. 28 shows a comparison in 
terms of recognition success rate for both human users and 
computer recognition programs versus the different ratios of 
the ORO parameter. As the graph confirms, the human 
recognition success rate rises earlier and faster than the 
computer recognition success rate. 
 
Fig. 28 - Comparison of computer recognition success rate vs. human 
recognition success rate according to different ORO values. 
As it can be observed from Fig. 28, the recognition success 
rate for ORO values is less than 20% for both human users and 
those for computers is equal to zero. This means there is no 
sufficient information presented about the object and the users 
(nor automated computer programs) are not able to perceive 
any useful information. A critical value for ORO, which has 
been determined during the experiments of this research is 
when ORO = 20%, for which there is a big jump from 0% to 
65% in terms of human recognition success rate while the 
computer recognition success rate is still at 0%. The ratio of 
ORO = 20% is defined as the Optimal Character Recognition 
rate.  At this specific rate, the VICAP model can satisfy the 
requirements of a CAPTCHA. 
As Fig. 28 shows, by increasing the value of the ORO 
parameter further, the recognition success rate will improve for 
both humans and computers. However, looking at the graph, it 
is clear that the recognition success rate increases more quickly 
for humans than computers. For example, according to the 
experimental results, the participants in the evaluation 
experiments were able to see the characters with 100% success, 
at the rate of ORO = 40%, while the same level of recognition 
success rate for the computer programs would be possible at 
ORO = 70%. This significant difference confirms the strength 
of the proposed model, which capitalises on the properties of 
the human visual system. Conclusively, in terms of the 
recognition success rate, as it can be observed from Fig. 28, the 
optimal setting for the ORO parameter is ORO = 20%, which 
provides a satisfactory success rate of 65% for human users, 
while demonstrating robustness to OCR attacks with a 
recognition rate of 0%. 
 
5.2. Recognition Improvement Level (RIL) 
In the previous section, different levels of recognition 
success rates for both human users and computer programs 
were compared and analysed according to varying values of the 
ORO parameter. In this section, we focus our attention on the 
analysis of the Recognition Improvement Level (RIL) in terms 
of security and robustness of the CAPTCHA challenge. RIL 
can be simply defined as the difference between the human 
recognition and the computer recognition levels. This 
difference may demonstrate the actual impact of the VICAP 
model in terms of the human recognition success rate and the 
computer recognition robustness level. The RIL parameter is 
important in this research because when we study the impact of 
different choices of the ORO parameter on the test, it is 
important that we understand what values of ORO will provide 
the best possible performance for the proposed CAPTCHA 
model. In other words, we would like to determine the 
percentage of the ORO parameter where the CAPTCHA 
challenge would have the highest level in terms of human 
recognition rate, but at the same time, have the lowest possible 
level for the computer recognition rate, i.e., the greatest 
difference between the two. This is possible to achieve by 
examining the RIL parameter. 
When the RIL value is at its maximum, the parameters of 
the proposed CAPTCHA model are optimally chosen.  In other 
words, the CAPTCHA is very hard for the computer programs 
to break, while it is very easy for human users to solve. 
Similarly, as the value of RIL gets smaller, the CAPTCHA is 
more vulnerable against different computer-based attacks. 
Table 8 is a comparison between various choices of the ORO 
parameter and the associated RIL values. 
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Table 8. Recognition Improvement Level (RIL); Comparison of 
different values of the ORO parameter and their corresponding 
RIL values. 
ORO 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
RIL 0% 65% 60% 50% 20% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
As it can be observed from Table 8, the value of the RIL 
parameter in the beginning is equal to 0%, meaning that the 
CAPTCHA is neither recognisable to humans nor to computer 
programs. The highest value of RIL parameter occurs when 
ORO = 20%, where RIL = 65%. As the value of the ORO 
parameter increases, the value of the RIL parameter decreases, 
meaning that the security level of the test is reducing rapidly. 
From ORO = 30% until ORO = 60% the robustness and 
security level of the proposed CAPTCHA model is decreasing 
fast until it reaches the level of ORO = 70%. At this rate, the 
proposed CAPTCHA model will be vulnerable against most of 
the character recognition techniques. Therefore, the ideal 
situation is when the RIL parameter is at its highest level, 
which in this experiment, is measured as RIL = 65%.  
5.3. Diversions in Human Perception 
Since performance analysis in terms of security and 
robustness of the proposed VICAP model have been measured 
for both human users and computer recognition programs, here 
we would like to demonstrate whether there are any 
exceptional cases that would affect the human recognition rate 
rather than computer recognition. 
In order to clarify this issue, we have interpreted the 
definition of “diversion in human perception” in two scenarios. 
In the first scenario, we have compared the accuracy of the 
human perception against computer recognition programs and 
thus, we have presented some samples from our passed 
experiment results.  
Since our experimental results confirm, human visual 
system is responding to the proposed CAPTCHA model more 
accurately than current computer recognition programs. As a 
result, a complete recognition success rate for human users 
starts from ORO = 40% which will give Human Recognition 
Success Rate (HRSR) = 100%. Nevertheless, a complete 
recognition success rate for the computer program starts at the 
rate of ORO = 70% which will give CRSR = 100%. Since there 
is such a big gap (around 30%) between the ratio of ORO in 
HRSR and CRSR, therefore, it can be concluded that the worst 
recognition score rate for humans was still far better than any 
computer recognition software. 
Since in total over 200 different experiment have been 
conducted for Computer Recognition Success Rate (CRSR) 
and over 150 different human experiments have been 
conducted for Human Recognition Success Rate (HRSR). 
Table 9 is representing the worst and best case scenario for 
each CRSR and HRSR for the different ORO ratios, where, 0% 
represent the worst and 100% represents the best recognition 
rate. As it can be observed form Table 9, the is nor such a case 
that the worst case scenario for HRSR is lower than worst case 
scenario for CRSR and always HRSR was either equal or 
higher than CRSR. That means the humans recognition rate 
was always performing better than computer recognition 
programs. 
 
Table 9. The table represent the best and the worst recognition 
success rate for both human users and computer programs for 
different scopes of ORO parameter. 
ORO  
Worst Recognition 
Rate (%) 
Best Recognition 
Rate (%) 
10% 
CRSR 0 0 
HRSR 0 0 
15% 
CRSR 0 0 
HRSR 0 0 
20% 
CRSR 0 0 
HRSR 0 100 
25% 
CRSR 0 0 
HRSR 0 100 
30% 
CRSR 0 100 
HRSR 0 100 
35% 
CRSR 0 100 
HRSR 0 100 
40% 
CRSR 0 100 
HRSR 100 100 
45% 
CRSR 0 100 
HRSR 100 100 
50% 
CRSR 0 100 
HRSR 100 100 
55% 
CRSR 0 100 
HRSR 100 100 
60% 
CRSR 0 100 
HRSR 100 100 
65% 
CRSR 0 100 
HRSR 100 100 
70% 
CRSR 100 100 
HRSR 100 100 
The second scenario, would be the case that human 
perception would be distracted due to the sudden change in the 
user environment. For instance, somebody suddenly walks into 
the room or the telephone starts to ring and etc. that requires 
attention of the end user. Since our proposed CAPTCHA 
model is based on persistence of vision and superimposing if 
information using iconic memory, it requires a short attention 
on the sequence. Therefore, if the user’s attention is distracted 
even for a very short period of time, the effect of persistence of 
vison would not make affect and therefore, the final image 
would not make appear on the human’s perceptual system.  
Since, in our experiments we have assumed the equal 
environmental conditions for both human users and computer 
attackers which in this case human users are not affected by 
any kind of interruptions during the test. However, the effect of 
these “diversions” would not affect the accuracy of the test, but 
it would only affect the time taking to solve the CAPTCHA. 
Since, in our proposed CAPTCHA model, the “original 
frames” are mixing randomly with “random frames” therefore, 
by disrupting the user’s attention the accuracy of the answer 
will not be affected and the user requires to focus again on the 
sequence in order to perceive the sufficient amount of visual 
information to realise the answer.  
Though, this process requires more time from the user in 
order to recognise the final answer to the test regardless of the 
quality of the response. In terms of computer recognition, it is 
the same condition and because the VICAP sequence generator 
is based on random function, therefore, the recognition process 
starts from the time that individual frames are being processed 
regardless of how long it would take to break the CAPTCHA. 
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5.4. Text-Recognition Algorithm working on Visual 
Traces 
Another important security issues with most of the text-
based CAPTCHAs are the dictionary-based attacks or guessing 
attacks. These types of CAPTCHA attacks are based on 
recognizing of partial information from a string of characters 
and based on the preceding and succeeding information, the 
recognition software would be able to predict the missing 
elements. Finally, by mapping and comparing the deciphered 
information against a dictionary database, the program would 
be able to retrieve decipher the unrecognized word or elements 
of string. 
Since in the proposed CAPTCHA model, the order of the 
frames is randomly selected and also the way each individual 
frame is rendered and presented to the user is also random, 
therefore it is impossible for any text recognition program to 
predict the future location of the pixels corresponding to the 
original character. However, in the case of any sequence 
follows a regular or uniform behaviour, then, it would be 
possible to track the changes and base on that information it 
would be possible to predict the final object. For instance, by 
looking at the example below we can realise that in the first 
example the symbol “?” can be declared as letter “C” based on 
the preceding and succeeding information. 
 
However, in the second example below, it is impossible to 
have a guess about the value of symbol “?”. This is because of 
fact that the presentation of object pixels and background noise 
pixels in all the preceding and succeeding frames are selected 
randomly, in the context of a single frame. The lack of uniform 
and regular patterns in the frame information prevents any 
predictive algorithms to predict the future position of pixels 
and as such decipher the original character. 
 
On the other hand, since our proposed CAPTCHA model is 
not dictionary-based and every individual elements of the 
CAPTCHA string is selected randomly, therefore, even by 
decoding one or two elements it would not be possible for the 
computer recognition programs to guess the entire CAPTCHA 
string. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, a novel CAPTCHA model called VICAP was 
introduced in order to increase the level of security and 
robustness of websites and online service providers. The 
VICAP model is based on the ability of the human eye to 
superimpose and build a final image from a sequence of 
images. Since our proposed CAPTCHA model is designed to 
work in cooperation with the sophisticated properties of the 
human visual system, it is believed that none of the current 
computer recognition programs would be able to break this 
CAPTCHA model. Consequently, the VICAP model is secure 
and robust against different computer-based attacks. 
The resilience of the proposed CAPTCHA model has been 
tested and analyzed on both human users and some of the 
current and most powerful character recognition programs. 
Using the state of the art CAPTCHA Breaker Application and 
conducting over 700 experiments on both human users and 
computer-based attacks, we have achieved a good level of 
knowledge in terms of security and usability of our proposed 
CAPTCHA model. As a result of this research, character 
recognition success rates for human users compared to 
computer-based recognition programs would ideally increase 
by 65%. 
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